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For a long time, the consensus among financial economists as well as among finance academics and 
practitioners has been that a country’s domestic investors have an advantage in trading stocks in their 
country over foreign investors. A leading explanation for this advantage has been that domestic investors 
have superior information, but other explanations have been advanced also. For instance, it has been 
argued that regulators might be more tolerant of domestic investors or even biased against foreign 
investors. This view that domestic investors have an edge over foreign investors has been used to explain 
empirical regularities such as the home bias, the volatility of capital flows, and herding among foreign 
investors. However, recently, a number of papers have provided results that are inconsistent with this 
view.1  
In this paper, we use a unique dataset to shed new light on the issue of whether domestic investors 
have an edge over foreign investors in trading domestic stocks by investigating whether foreigners pay 
more for stocks when they buy and receive less when they sell. One advantage of such an investigation is 
that it relies less on models of expected returns than existing papers that compare the performance of 
foreign investors to the performance of domestic investors. Using a dataset of all trades on the Korean 
stock exchange from December 2, 1996 to November 30, 1998, we find evidence that foreign investors 
are at a disadvantage for medium and large trades but not for small trades. Weighting trades by their size, 
the average disadvantage of foreign money managers relative to domestic money managers is of the order 
of 21 basis points for purchases and 16 basis points for sales. This means that on a roundtrip trade foreign 
money managers face greater transaction costs of the order of 37 basis points compared to domestic 
money managers, which is substantial for any foreign investor who is not a long-term buy-and-hold 
investor. For instance, an investor who trades three times per year would contemplate a drag on his 
performance in excess of 100 basis points. To put this in perspective, Carhart (1997) reports that the 
difference in the monthly estimates of Jensen’s alpha between the top decile and the bottom decile of 
                                                     
1 See, for instance, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), Seasholes (2000), and Froot and Ramadorai (2001).  
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diversified mutual funds in the U.S. is 0.67% from 1963 through 1993. The roundtrip edge could 
therefore have a substantial impact on the performance of a money manager. We also find that foreign 
money managers are at a disadvantage compared to domestic individuals, but this evidence is stronger for 
sales than for purchases. 
We find that the disadvantage of foreign investors cannot be explained by firm and stock 
characteristics. It is strongly related to the size of the trades of foreign investors and to how intensely they 
trade. There are at least three non-mutually exclusive explanations for this result. First, foreign investors 
could be more impatient or trade when liquidity is lower, so that they pay more to liquidity providers. 
Second, foreign investors are better informed, so that their trades have a larger permanent impact. Third, 
they make their trades after prices have already moved against them. To investigate these three possible 
explanations, we investigate stock returns before, during, and after periods of intensive trading. We find 
that the intensive trading by foreign investors is not associated with a greater temporary impact than the 
intensive trading by domestic institutions, suggesting that foreign investors are not more impatient in their 
trading than domestic institutions. Using a conventional measure of the permanent impact of intensive 
trading, there is no evidence either that foreign investors are better informed than domestic institutions. 
The key difference between foreign investors and domestic investors is that prices move unfavorably for 
foreign investors than for domestic investors immediately before they trade intensively. This difference is 
partly explained by the return-chasing behavior of foreign investors.  
As far as we know, this is the first paper that compares in any country the prices domestic and foreign 
investors pay or receive when they trade. More effort has been expended on understanding whether 
foreigners earn more or less than domestic investors on their investments in stocks. Studies that evaluate 
investment performance face the problem that their results are sensitive to how they control for priced risk. 
In contrast, when comparing prices within a calendar day, control for risk priced in asset pricing models is 
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not important, so that the conclusions one reaches do not depend on the choice and parameters of asset 
pricing models.  
The controls for risk may partly explain why there is no agreement in the literature on whether 
foreigners perform better than domestic investors and on whether domestic investors have an information 
advantage. Interestingly, when Dvorak (2002) implements our approach for Indonesia, he also finds that 
foreign investors are at a disadvantage. Hau (2001) investigates trading data for professional investors. In 
his work, he shows that local investors perform better than other investors. However, his paper is focused 
on professional investors only and looks at the performance of traders over time rather than whether they 
buy or sell at advantageous prices. Other papers look at the performance of foreign investors compared to 
the performance of domestic investors over periods of various lengths. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) 
and Seasholes (2000) argue that as a result of their better access to expertise and talent, foreign 
institutions should perform better than domestic institutions. Using daily data for the 16 largest Finnish 
stocks, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) find that over a two-year period foreigners and domestic financial 
corporations buy more stocks that perform well over the next 120 trading days than domestic individual 
investors, but their sample period is too short for them to conduct a study of holding period returns. 
Seasholes (2000) finds that foreign investors buy (sell) ahead of good (bad) earnings announcements in 
Taiwan while domestic investors do the opposite. Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001) and Froot and 
Ramadorai (2001) use flow data to show that foreign investors trade ahead of better returns. These papers 
are consistent with better information and greater sophistication on the part of foreign investors. However, 
evidence on the performance of foreign investors is mixed. For instance, Shukla and van Inwegen (1995) 
show that U.K. money managers underperform American money managers when picking U.S. stocks. 
Kang and Stulz (1997) using annual data for 18 years find no evidence that foreign investors outperform 
domestic investors in Japan. Coval and Moskowitz (1999), using only U.S. stock returns, provide 
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evidence that investor location matters, in that mutual fund managers are better at picking stocks of firms 
that are close to where they are than stocks of firms from a more distant location.  
Throughout the paper, we compare foreign investors to both domestic institutional investors and 
domestic individuals. Such a comparison is important for two reasons. First, foreign investors are mostly 
institutional investors. Consequently, we have to understand whether foreign investors differ from 
domestic investors as a group because they are foreign or simply because they are institutional investors. 
Second, in emerging markets, domestic institutional investors are not as important as they are in 
developed markets and their actions may at times be affected by political considerations. As suggested by 
some authors (Seasholes, 2000, and Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000), foreign investors may have an 
advantage over domestic institutions simply because their personnel is more experienced, has access to 
more proprietary research, and does not have to worry about trading to fulfill political objectives or to 
help out related companies. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, we introduce our data. In Section 2, we compare the 
prices at which various investor types trade, and the determinants of the trade price differences between 
domestic and foreign investors are examined in Section 3. In Section 4, we compare the price impact and 
the performance of intensive trading for domestic and foreign investors. We conclude in Section 5.  
 
1. The Korea Stock Exchange and Sample Construction 
Over our sample period, the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) holds two trading sessions on each weekday: a 
morning session and an afternoon session. Batch auctions are used three times a day to determine the 
opening prices of each session and the daily closing prices. The batch auction price for a stock is the same 
for all investors, so that foreign investors cannot be at a disadvantage compared to domestic investors 
when they trade in a batch auction. There are no trades during the last 10 minutes of each day, when 
orders are collected for the closing batch auction. Trading prices during the rest of the trading hours are 
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determined by continuous (or non-batch) auction. During our sample period, there is a morning session on 
Saturdays. The KSE does not have designated market makers. Buyers and sellers meet via the Automated 
Trading System (ATS). Before November 25, 1996, only limit orders were allowed, but since then market 
orders are allowed as well. 
The database we use includes all transactions on the KSE for the period from December 2, 1996 to 
November 30, 1998, which is compiled by the Institute of Finance and Banking (IFB) at Seoul National 
University.  This database has each order time-stamped as of the time that it arrives at the exchange and 
as of the time that the order is executed. The data provide information on the country of residence of 
investors as well as on whether they are individuals or institutions. Institutions are further classified into 
various types of institutions, such as securities firms, mutual funds, banks, and insurance companies. 
Foreign investors in Korea have to register with the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) and obtain an ID 
number before they can start trading stocks. Through this ID number, the FSS makes sure that the foreign 
ownership limit for each company and each foreign investor is not exceeded by informing the KSE 
whether a foreign order satisfies the company and investor limits. The ownership limit for each individual 
foreign investor was 5% of a firm’s shares until May 2, 1997, when it increased to 6%. It then increased 
to 7% on November 3, 1997, and to 50% on December 11, 1997. In addition, foreign investors as a group 
could not own more than 20% of a firm's shares before May 1, 1997. This aggregate ownership limit on 
foreign investors increased to 23% on May 2, 1997, to 26% on November 3, 1997, to 50% on December 
11, 1997, to 55% on December 30, 1997, and finally to 100% on May 25, 1998. One limitation of the 
foreign ownership database is that it is possible that trades we identify as foreign trades are actually trades 
by Korean investors who set up a foreign nominee company to trade on the KSE. 
Our database only allows us to know the type of investor who participates in the transaction. We are 
not allowed to know the identity of the investor who buys or sells a stock in a particular transaction. This 
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limitation of our database prevents us from tracking the holdings or trades of specific investors. We have 
no way of knowing whether one investor bought a stock multiple times in a day or only one time.  
We have detailed ownership information for 1998. At the end of 1998, foreign investors owned 18% 
of the capitalization of Korean stocks. Domestic banks owned 7.30% of the Korean stock market, while 
domestic money managers owned 6.30%. These domestic institutional investors owned a smaller fraction 
of the Korean stock market than foreign investors. Korean corporations owned 19.80% of the market, 
while the government and government-owned firms owned 19.70% of the market. Finally, individuals 
owned 28.90% of the market. Compared to Western countries, few individuals owned stocks directly 
since only 4.1% of Korean domestics were investors in the market.  
Most of the trading in the Korean stock market is done by individual investors. In 1998, 77.43% of 
the gross value of stock sales was by domestic individual investors. In contrast, 5.9% of the gross value of 
stock sales was by foreign investors and 13.71% was by domestic institutional investors. The gross stock 
sales by the government and by corporations together represented only 2.88% of the gross stock sales. 
The fact that the trading of the government and of corporations represents such a small fraction of the 
overall trading explains why we ignore it in our study. With this data, domestic investors are more active 
traders than foreign investors and domestic individuals are more active traders than domestic institutions. 
This contrasts with the results of Tesar and Werner (1995) for more developed countries, where foreign 
investors are more active traders than local investors. In Korea, foreign investors sell stocks for a gross 
amount equal to 47% of their end-of-year ownership, while domestic individual investors sell stocks for a 
gross amount equal to 381% of their end-of-year ownership. Domestic institutions sell stocks for a gross 
amount of 143% of the value of their end-of-year holdings. Foreign investors are mostly institutions, so 
that foreign institutions trade much less in Korea than domestic institutions.  
Table 1 provides another way to look at the relative importance of individuals, domestic institutions, 
and foreign investors in the trading of Korean stocks. In this table, we divide up the day in hourly periods. 
 7
We see that individual investors account for more than half of the value of the stocks traded in each 
period in the table. Except for the afternoon opening batch and the closing batch, the value of trades by 
foreign investors is lower than the value of trades by domestic institutions.  
Figure 1 shows the cumulative net flows of various investor groups over our sample period against 
the backdrop of the ownership limit and the performance of the Korea stock market. Over the sample 
period, foreign investors never have net negative cumulative flows and neither do individual investors. 
Both foreign investors and Korean individual investors accumulate holdings of Korean stocks over the 
sample period by buying from Korean financial institutions that are net sellers over our sample period. 
This figure puts in perspective the impact of the Asian crisis on holdings of Korean stocks by foreign 
investors. Though foreign investors sold stocks at the height of the crisis, they did not sell enough to make 
their ownership of the Korean stock market fall below what it had been at the end of 1996. Since the 
Korean stock market experienced dramatic changes during our sample period, we control for market 
conditions in our regressions.  
Over our sample period there are three Korean ADRs trading on the NYSE in addition to the Korea 
Fund. At the end of 1996, the shares corresponding to the ADRs represent a small fraction of the 
outstanding shares of the firms that have issued ADRs (2.3% for Kepco, 5.2% for Posco, and 1.8% for SK 
Telecom). Our data exclude New York trading. At most, New York trading may affect the results for 
three stocks.  
 
2. Do Foreign Investors Trade at Worse Prices?  
In this section, we investigate whether the various investor types trade at different prices. We include in 
our sample all days during which foreign investors traded a stock. This means that we estimate whether 
foreign investors are at a disadvantage given that they trade. Our approach does not, therefore, address the 
extent to which foreign investors are at a disadvantage unconditionally. We do not attempt to estimate 
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what their disadvantage would be on days and for stocks where the disadvantage is large enough to make 
it uneconomical for foreign investors to trade.  
Define dtiP  as the price of stock i on day d for trade t and 
dt
iV  as the number of shares of the trade 
for stock i on day d for trade t. We first compute the volume-weighted average price – this is what the 
practitioners call “bwap,” the buy weighted-average price – using all trades on that day: 
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where the subscript j denotes the investor class j. We consider split trades originated from one order as 
one trade. We finally compute the price ratio, di
d
ji AB , , for all purchases (or sales) by investors of type j 
for stock i on a given day d. A price ratio greater than one for the purchases of an investor type means that 
this investor type buys on average at a price above the average price on that day. Everything else equal, a 
type of investors is disadvantaged relative to another type of investors for purchases if investors of the 
first type buy at a higher price than the investors of the second type. Similarly, a type of investors that 
sells at a lower price than another type of investors is at a disadvantage relative to that type of investors. 
Studies that investigate trading costs compare prices paid to the average price on a day, to the closing 
price, or to the previous day closing price. Even though price ratios are sensitive to the price in the 
denominator of the price ratio, the difference in price ratios is not since the price in the denominator 
affects both price ratios similarly. Our results are the same when we compute the difference in price ratios 
using the previous day closing price in the denominator.  Though we report price ratios for purchases and 
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sales, we therefore focus our study on differences in price ratios since they offer a measure how one type 
of investors is disadvantaged relative to another type. In the remainder of this section, we first provide 
evidence on differences in the price ratios over our sample period for the various investor classes for buy 
and sell trades. We then investigate the determinants of these differences across stocks using cross-
sectional regressions in the next section.  
The equally-weighted average of the price ratios across stocks and days for each investor type is 
shown in Panel A of Table 2. We report results separately for domestic and foreign individuals, money 
managers, and banks. We do not report results for resident foreign investors, government and corporate 
holdings because their economic importance is trivial. For example, for foreign money managers, the 
price ratio gives us the equally-weighted average across stocks and days of the volume-weighted average 
price at which they bought stocks normalized by the volume-weighted average price at which the stocks 
traded on the days. Foreign money managers are the foreign investors who trade the largest number of 
stocks on a given day. We focus on them in most of our discussion of the table. Looking at the foreign 
money managers, the ratio (multiplied by 100) is 99.988 using all observations, which is insignificantly 
different from 100. This means that foreign money managers do not trade at prices significantly different 
from the average price in a day. They buy stocks, however, at significantly higher prices than Korean 
individuals. The price ratio for foreign investors is higher than the price ratio of Korean individual 
investors by 0.151 with a t-statistic of 10.50. This means that foreign money managers buy stocks at a 
price that is on average 0.15% greater than the average daily price paid by Korean individual investors. In 
contrast, there is no difference in the price that foreign money managers pay relative to the price domestic 
money managers pay.   
The problem with comparing prices paid across all trade sizes is that we might be comparing prices 
paid on large trades by foreign investors to small trades made by domestic individuals and/or institutions. 
For instance, it could be that domestic individuals make more small trades and that the prices for these 
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trades are more advantageous. To examine the impact of trade size on our results, we divide trades into 
small, medium, and large trades. This reduces the number of stocks used in the comparisons since for 
each comparison we are adding a constraint to the sample that trades must be in the same size category. 
Small trades are trades for less than 5M won, while medium trades are between 5M and 50M won, and 
large trades are trades for more than 50M. 2  Small trades are overwhelmingly made by domestic 
individuals during our sample period. 53.9% of daily total trades are small trades by individuals. Another 
29.96% of daily trades are medium-size trades by individuals. The small and medium trades of foreign 
investors represent 1.93% and 3.60%, respectively, of daily trades.   
We find that there is no evidence that foreign money managers are at a disadvantage for small-size 
trades. They trade at the same prices as individuals and at better prices than domestic money managers. 
However, foreign money managers trade at worse prices than domestic individuals and money managers 
for medium trades and than domestic money managers for large trades. Strikingly, domestic money 
managers pay significantly lower prices for large purchase trades than either domestic individual 
investors or foreign investors. In particular, domestic money managers pay 0.143% less than foreign 
money managers with a t-statistic of 5.27.  
Let’s now turn to Panel B of Table 2, where we show results for the selling trades of investors. The 
average selling price ratio for foreign money managers is significantly below one, so that they sell at a 
lower price than the average price during the day. For the whole sample, foreign investors sell at worse 
prices than domestic individuals, but not than domestic money managers. When we split trades according 
to their size, we find that foreign money managers are at a disadvantage for medium and large trades 
compared to both domestic individuals and institutions. For small trades, they sell at worse prices than 
individuals but at better prices than domestic institutions.  
                                                     
2 The 5 million won is roughly equivalent to US$4,200 at the exchange rate of 1,200 won per US$. The cutoff in 
won value rather than in shares is chosen to control for the wide differences in prices across stocks in Korea. 
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In Panel C of Table 2 we compare trade-value weighted price ratios. This approach weighs the daily 
price ratios across stocks on a given day using the value of the daily trades, so that more weight is given 
to stocks where foreign investors trade more intensively when computing the average price ratio. With 
this measure, foreign money managers have a disadvantage relative to domestic money managers of 
0.212% when they buy and of 0.163% when they sell for the whole sample. The disadvantage of foreign 
money managers is slightly higher when the comparison is limited to the largest trades. Foreign money 
managers also have a substantial disadvantage relative to domestic individual investors when we use 
trade-weighted averages. All these differences are statistically significant.   
Our sample period includes the East Asian crisis. Consequently, stock prices fall dramatically and 
then increase sharply during our sample period. Further, regulations change also during our period. For 
instance, the limit on foreign holdings increases. Index futures trading becomes more important 
throughout our sample period. Finally, index options trading is introduced in July 1997. Figure 2 shows a 
time-series plot of the price ratio differences. As can be seen from both panels of the figure, there is no 
evidence that the phenomenon we document is related to the East Asian crisis or that derivatives trading 
and regulatory changes reduce the disadvantage of foreign investors relative to domestic investors. This 
disadvantage seems pervasive through time. We also examine the main days of the crisis. We select seven 
two-day periods during the crisis that are associated with major events.3 There is no clear evidence that 
foreign investors are at a disadvantage when they sell on these days compared to domestic individuals and 
they seem to be at an advantage compared to domestic institutions. Consequently, these days play no 
significant role in our overall results.  
                                                     
3 The events we selected are: 1) currency devaluation on 11/17/97 in Korean time (Event days = 11/15/97 and 
11/17/97); 2) seek for IMF help on 11/21/97 in Korean time (Event days = 11/20/97 and 11/21/97); 3) resume talks 
on rescue package on 12/01/97 in New York time (Event days = 12/01/97 and 12/02/97); 4) agreed on terms of the 
rescue package on 12/04/97 in New York time (Event days = 12/04/97 and 12/05/97); 5) speed up delivery of the 
rescue loan on 12/15/97 in New York time (Event days = 12/15/97 and 12/16/97); 6) rollover short-term bank debt 
on 12/30/97 in New York time (Event days = 01/03/98 and 01/05/98); 7) agreed new loans to Korean banks on 
01/29/98 in New York time (Event days = 01/30/98 and 01/31/98).  
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An alternate approach to investigate whether the results are due to bad days for the Korean market is 
to split the days into quintiles of stock market performance. We find that, for every quintile, foreign 
investors buy at a significantly higher price than domestic individuals and at an insignificantly lower price 
than domestic institutions. For the worst quintile of market performance, foreign investors who sell 
receive less than domestic institutions. In contrast, they receive more than domestic institutions for the 
best quintile of market performance. The same results hold if, instead of splitting the sample into market 
performance quintiles, we split the sample into foreign exchange performance quintiles. For foreign 
exchange performance, the result is stronger when we compare foreign investors to domestic individuals: 
foreign investors pay more when they buy on days of high depreciation of the won and receive less when 
they sell on days of high depreciation of the won.  
 
3. The Determinants of Trade Prices.  
In the previous section, we saw that foreign investors are at a disadvantage relative to domestic investors. 
In this section, we investigate whether this disadvantage can be explained by firm and stock 
characteristics using multiple regressions. If foreign investors are less well-informed as is commonly 
believed, it should be that their disadvantage can be explained by firm and stock characteristics that proxy 
for information asymmetries since their disadvantage should be greater for stocks where information 
asymmetries are greater. Further, if differences in trading styles explain the disadvantage of foreign 
investors, then variables that proxy for when foreign investors are more likely to trade compared to 
domestic investors should explain their disadvantage. For instance, if foreign investors are more likely to 
trade in a stock when it has become relatively less liquid, they will trade at worse prices. In particular, we 
know from earlier research that foreign investors tend to be momentum investors.4 Keim (2003) shows 
                                                     
4 For Korea, see Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999). 
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that momentum investors have a higher price impact than other investors because, as he puts it, they 
“paddle against the current,” as they buy when the stock price is increasing and sell when it is falling.  
Panel A of Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables used in the multiple 
regressions. We use trade-size dummies in our regressions to investigate whether trade price differences 
between domestic and foreign investors depend on trade size. We then control for stock characteristics, 
stock returns, and the market return. It is often argued that information asymmetries fall as firms get 
larger. Further, firms with better growth opportunities or a lower book-to-market ratio may have more 
information asymmetries because intangible assets are harder to assess. If foreign investors are at a 
disadvantage when trading stocks where information asymmetries are more important, one would expect 
the difference between domestic and foreign investor trade prices to fall as the market value of the firm’s 
equity increases (lsize) and fall as the book-to-market ratio increases (btm). If foreign investors are more 
impatient in their buying when the return on the market is higher, perhaps because of momentum trading,  
and more impatient in their selling when the return on the market is lower, we should see a negative 
coefficient on the KOSPI index return (kret) on the same day. If foreign investors are momentum traders, 
they are more likely to buy if the return of the stock in the recent past (ctc5) is high, if the overnight 
return (cto) is high, and if the contemporaneous open to close return (otc) is high. Since foreign investors 
are more likely to be momentum traders than domestic individuals and since the intensity of their 
momentum trading may differ from the intensity of the momentum trading of domestic institutions, we 
control for all these returns. Finally, we control for the average bid-ask spread prior to market close over 
the previous 30 trading days (avgbas), the stock’s average volatility over the previous 30 trading days 
(avgsig), and the average turnover of the stock over the previous 30 trading days (avgturn). Specifically, 
the variables are constructed as follows: 
─ Firm characteristics and market return: 
(1) lsize = Log market value of equity on the previous day 
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(2) btm = Book-to-market ratio on the previous day 
(3) kret = KOSPI index return for the day (%) 
─ Momentum-related characteristics: 
(1) ctc5 = Previous 5-day return (%) (previous 6th day close to previous close) 
(2) cto = Overnight return (%) (previous close to opening price) 
(3) otc = Day-time return (%) (opening to closing price) 
─ Trade-related characteristics that proxy for liquidity and execution costs: 
(1) avgbas = Average of previous 30 daily bid-ask spreads (at least 20 daily observations 
required), where daily bid-ask spread (%) = (ask-bid)/[(ask+bid)/2] prior to market close 
(2) avgsig = Average of previous 30 daily volatilities (at least 20 daily observations required), 
where daily volatility (%) = (high-low)/[(high+low)/2] 
(3) avgturn = Average of previous 30 daily turnover ratios (at least 20 daily observations 
required), where daily turnover ratio (%) = total share trading volume for the day / total 
shares outstanding for the firm 
(4) avgdf = Buy (or sell) trade value differences between two investor types for a stock-day / 
total trade value for the stock-day (%) 
 
In panel B of Table 3, we provide regression estimates from pooled regressions that use all 
observations throughout the sample period as well as from Fama-McBeth regressions. The advantage of 
the pooled regressions is that we can use the return on the market as an explanatory variable. The Fama-
McBeth regressions take into account the cross-correlations and the serial correlation in the error term, so 
that the t-statistics are much more conservative. We use as the dependent variable the difference in price 
ratios of foreign investors from domestic individuals and domestic institutions, separately. All foreign 
investors are aggregated in one group, excluding resident foreign investors. We show two regression 
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specifications for each comparison. The first comparison controls for trade size through the use of dummy 
variables for medium and large trades. Consequently, when estimating this regression, the dependent 
variable is the price ratio difference per stock day for a given trade size. The second comparison controls 
for the difference in traded value between the two types of investors. For that comparison, the dependent 
variable is the price ratio difference per stock day computed from all trades for that stock day.  
The first four regressions compare price ratios for domestic individuals and foreign investors. The 
trade size dummy variables have significant coefficients in the pooled regression. In the Fama-McBeth 
regression, the coefficient on the size dummy variables is larger and more significant. Somewhat 
surprisingly, foreign investors face less favorable prices when trading in large firms after controlling for 
other variables. It might be that this is due to the fact that the coefficient on the size variable measures the 
relation between size and the price difference for a given bid-ask spread which might capture information 
asymmetries.5 Book-to-market is insignificant in two regressions and significant, but with opposite signs, 
in the other two regressions. The coefficient on the return of the Korean market is barely significant in the 
pooled regression. When we use the bid-ask spread as a proxy for information asymmetries and the 
turnover ratio as a proxy for liquidity, we see that foreign investors do worse trading stocks with greater 
information asymmetries and less liquidity. We also see that foreigners trade at better prices stocks that 
have performed well over the last five days and overnight. This result is surprising in light of Keim 
(2003) who shows that momentum trading has higher impact costs. His analysis does not, however, 
control for a stock’s open-to-close return on the day of trading. To the extent that stocks that have 
performed well are more likely to have a high open-to-close return, controlling for open-to-close return 
could explain why the last five day return is not significant. We find that foreign investors perform worse 
for stocks that do well during the trading day. The next two regressions do not have the trade size dummy 
                                                     
5 This explanation can explain the result for purchases, but for sales, the coefficient remains positive if we have no 
other control variables but size.  
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variables. Instead, we control for the difference in trade value between investor types. The coefficient on 
the trade value difference is highly significant in both regressions. The clear message from the regressions 
is that foreign investors do worse when they buy more, either through larger trades or through more 
intensive trading. They also do worse on stocks with greater information asymmetries and higher same-
day return.  
In regressions (5) through (8), we investigate the determinants of the difference in price ratios 
between domestic institutional investors and foreign investors. In regressions (5) and (6), the trade size 
dummy variables have coefficients that are much larger than in regressions (1) and (2) and with extremely 
high t-statistics in the pooled regression, but lower t-statistics in the Fama-McBeth regressions. 
Regressions (7) and (8) show that coefficients on the difference in trade value are positive and significant 
in both regressions. Consequently, regressions (5) through (8) show that the disadvantage of foreign 
investors relative to domestic institutions increases when they buy more. The other coefficients are 
typically insignificant with the Fama-McBeth regressions, so that it is difficult to put much weight on 
those coefficients that are significant in the pooled regression except for the positive significant book-to-
market coefficient.  
We now turn to the sell price ratios. Regressions (9) through (12) are for the difference in sell price 
ratios between domestic individual investors and foreign investors. As we would expect from the 
regressions for buy price ratios, foreign investors receive worse prices as they sell more. Most of the other 
coefficients have the opposite sign from the coefficients in the regressions for buy price ratios as we 
would expect. The only puzzling result is that the coefficients on the return for the previous five days and 
on the overnight return do not switch sign. Regressions (13) through (16) show that foreign investors 
receive less when they sell more compared to domestic institutions. Again, the other variables are 
typically not significant in the Fama-McBeth regressions. The coefficient on the difference in trade value 
by investor types is highly significant in economic terms.  
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4. The Price Impact of Intensive Buying and Selling by Investor Types 
So far, our evidence is that foreign investors are at a disadvantage compared to domestic investors for 
larger trades and when they trade more intensively than domestic investors. Another way to put this is that 
foreign investors are more at a disadvantage when they trade more. The previous section shows that this 
disadvantage cannot be explained by firm and stock characteristics. Why do foreign investors pay more 
and receive less when they trade more? A first possible explanation is that foreign investors are not at a 
disadvantage, but that they are more impatient than domestic investors when they trade intensely or trade 
when liquidity is lower. This greater impatience could be due to differences in liquidity concerns or 
because they have private information that is more short-lived than for domestic investors. A second 
potential explanation is that foreign investors are better informed, so that their trades have a greater 
permanent impact on prices.  Finally, a third possible explanation is that the foreign investors trade at 
worse prices because prices have moved against them before they trade. This could be because they time 
trades poorly as a result of poor information, because they are taken advantage of in the trading process as 
a victim of front-running, or because they choose to trade after prices have moved as they follow intra-
day momentum strategies.  
To investigate these possible explanations, we examine the intra-day returns before, during, and 
following periods of intense trading by domestic individual investors, domestic institutions, and foreign 
institutions. If foreign investors are more impatient, their trades should have more of a temporary impact 
relative to the trades of domestic investors. If they are better informed, they should have more of a 
permanent impact. Finally, if they trade at poor prices because prices moved against them before their 
trades, prices should increase more before they buy and less before they sell than they do for similar 
trades by domestic investors.  
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In the remainder of this section, we first report estimates of the returns around periods of intensive 
trading by investor types. We then show that the differences in these returns between foreign investors 
and domestic investors cannot be explained simply by stock characteristics.  
 
4.1 The price impact of intra-day intensive trading by investor types 
To construct our sample of intra-day intensive trading, we use stocks for which we have at least 300 days 
with trading on the day and on the previous day. Further, we eliminate all stocks whose price falls below 
1,000 won during the sample period. We end up with a sample of 512 stocks out of a possible 785 stocks. 
We then divide each week day into 47 five-minute intervals from 9:30 a.m. to 15:00 p.m., treating the 
time interval of 11:30 a.m. to 13:05 p.m. as a single interval containing the lunch break and similarly for 
the time interval of 14:50 p.m. to 15:00 p.m., which contains an order collection period for the close.  For 
Saturdays, we have 23 five-minute periods. We look at returns for the 10 five-minute periods preceding 
the event and the 10 subsequent five-minute periods. We allow the sequence of five-minute periods to 
cross day boundaries. When they do, we count the overnight return as a five-minute period.  
For each of the intervals for each of the 512 stocks over the sample period, we compute price-setting 
order imbalances by an investor type by subtracting the price-setting sell volume from the price-setting 
buy volume. We call a trade initiated by an investor type a price-setting trade by that investor type. A 
buy-side (sell-side) price-setting trade for foreign investors is a trade where the buy (sell) order of the 
foreign investors came after the sell-side (buy-side) order and hence made the trade possible.6 We then 
select 10 intervals with the largest net buy price-setting imbalances and 10 intervals with the largest net 
sell price-setting imbalances for each stock and each investor type. For each of the selected events, we 
examine stock returns from the previous tenth (D-10) to the subsequent tenth (D+10) intervals 
                                                     
6 For the batch auctions, we cannot identify who initiates a trade, and exclude them from the analysis here. For 
NYSE data, it is common to identify the initiating party of a trade using a tick test such as the one proposed by Lee 
and Ready (1991). There is no need for a tick test with our data because we know which party initiates the trade. 
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surrounding the event. We report raw stock returns as well as returns adjusted for the sample average for 
the same day of the week and the same time interval.    
We first consider the largest price-setting imbalances by foreign investors in Panel A of Table 4. A 
period of intensive buying follows a sequence of positive returns. From D-10 to D-1, the cumulative 
mean-adjusted return is 0.314% with a t-statistic of 7.42. Net buy imbalances have a strong positive 
mean-adjusted return of 1.04% during the intense buying interval (D0). Interval (D+1) is still positive, but 
not significantly so. After that, there is a string of negative returns.  
If the period of intensive trading leads to a greater price increase than the price increase in the long-
run resulting from the information conveyed by the intensive trading, perhaps because a compensation is 
required for liquidity providers, we expect the excess in the price increase to disappear over the next few 
periods. Consequently, we measure the permanent effect of the intensive trading by the cumulative 
abnormal return from the end of the period immediately preceding the intensive trading to 10 periods after 
the intensive trading period, CAR(0,+10). If stock prices adjust completely to the new information over 
the 10 periods following the intensive trading period, the cumulative abnormal return from interval +1 to 
interval +10, CAR(+1,+10), corresponds to the transitory part of the return associated with the intensive 
trading period, which we call the temporary price effect following Holthausen, Mayers, and Leftwich 
(1987). Panel A of Table 4 shows that the permanent effect of the intensive buying by foreign investors is 
0.897% in contrast to the temporary effect which is a significantly negative -0.144%. The temporary 
effect can be viewed as compensation to liquidity providers.  
When we turn to intensive selling intervals, we find that intensive selling periods follow positive 
mean-adjusted returns. The cumulative mean-adjusted return from D-10 to D-1 is 0.137%, in contrast to 
0.314% for intensive buying intervals. The mean-adjusted return at D0 is –0.730%. The permanent effect 
is only –0.136% with a t-statistic of –2.97. In contrast, the temporary effect is 0.594% with a t-statistic of 
13.37. The permanent effect of sales is therefore minimal and most of the price decline during the period 
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of intensive selling reverses over the subsequent periods, and thus can be regarded as a compensation for 
liquidity providers.  
We now compare the price impact of intensive trading by foreign investors to the price impact of 
intensive trading by domestic institutions. Panel B of Table 4 shows that purchases by domestic 
institutions follow insignificant cumulative mean-adjusted returns in contrast to purchases by foreign 
investors. Purchases by domestic institutions have a higher price impact than purchases by foreign 
investors. The D0 mean-adjusted return for institutions is 1.220% which is 0.179% more than for foreign 
investors. The permanent impact is 0.950%, which exceeds the price impact of trades by foreign investors 
by 0.053%. Looking at sell trades by domestic institutions, we find that institutions sell after positive 
returns. The average cumulative mean-adjusted return before the period of intensive selling is 0.415%, 
which is substantially larger than for intensive selling by foreign investors. Their price impact at D0 is 
higher in absolute value since it is –0.933% compared to –0.730% for foreign investors, but the 
permanent impact is actually less for domestic institutions since it is –0.085% compared to –0.136% for 
foreign institutions. Based on this evidence, we have to conclude that the differences in price impact for 
sell trades between domestic and foreign institutional investors are small.  
Panel C of Table 4 provides evidence for domestic individual investors. Domestic individual 
investors buy intensively after intervals of negative returns. We see that the immediate price impact of 
their buy trades is similar to the one of domestic institutions, but the permanent price impact is higher. 
Domestic individuals sell after intervals of positive returns. The immediate price impact of their sell 
trades is comparable to the one of domestic institutions, but the permanent price impact is higher also. For 
individual trades, the permanent price impact for sell trades is –0.456%, while for domestic institutions it 
is –0.085%. In other words, the permanent price impact of individual investors is consistent with them 
being better informed than either domestic or foreign institutions. Though not reported, it is striking that 
the relative size of the price-setting imbalances of domestic institutions and foreign investors in our 
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sample of intensive trading periods are roughly of the same size. For instance, the price-setting buy 
imbalance of foreign investors at D0 is 20.72% relative to the total trade volume of the day, while the 
price-setting buy imbalance of domestic institutions is 20.27%. In contrast, the price-setting buy 
imbalance of individuals is a much smaller 6.28%. In other words, individuals have a large permanent 
price impact for trades that are less than a third the size of the trades of domestic or foreign institutions. 
 
4.2 The determinants of the returns around periods of intensive trading by investor types 
A concern with our results is that they could be driven by differences in firm characteristics and market 
conditions. To control for these difference, we regress the estimated CARs on dummies for investor 
groups and the variables we used in the regressions reported in the previous section. In Panel A of Table 5, 
we show regressions for the permanent price impact of periods of intensive trading. The message of the 
regressions is clearer for periods of intensive selling than for periods of intensive buying. For periods of 
intensive selling, the price impact is largest for individual investors and is not significantly different for 
domestic institutions and foreign investors. For periods of intensive buying, the price impact is largest for 
individuals in the first regression, but as we add control variables the price impact increases for domestic 
institutions and foreign investors so that with all the control variables the permanent price impact is 
higher for domestic institutions and foreign investors than for domestic individuals. We provide the same 
regressions for the temporary price impact in Panel B. The highest temporary price impact in absolute 
value is for domestic institutions. Foreign investors have less of an impact than domestic institutions. For 
sales only, they seem to have more of an impact than domestic individuals. Finally, we provide 
regressions for CAR(-10, -1) in Panel C. For these regressions, foreign investors have a higher cumulative 
abnormal return before the period of intensive buying than either domestic institutions or domestic 
individuals; the opposite occurs before periods of intensive selling.   
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These regressions indicate that there is no evidence that foreign investors’ periods of intensive trading 
have a higher permanent price impact during a day. There is therefore no indication that the market infers 
from their trades that they are somehow better informed. There is no indication either that they are more 
impatient than domestic institutions in the sense of being willing to pay more for immediate execution, in 
that the temporary impact of their periods of intensive trading is never less than the temporary impact of 
periods of intensive trading of domestic institutions. The key difference between domestic and foreign 
investors when they trade intensively has nothing to do with what happens to prices during the interval 
when investors trade intensively or afterwards. Instead, it has to do with what happens before they trade 
intensively. As Figure 3 makes clear, prices move more against the trades of foreign investors before they 
trade intensively than they do against the trades of domestic investors. This could be because the trading 
of foreign investors is more anticipated or because of intra-day return chasing by foreigners. In order to 
see whether foreign trading is more anticipated, we regress the CAR(0,+1) on CAR(-10,-1), allowing for 
a different coefficient for foreign investors. Greater anticipation means that the market is less surprised by 
the intensive trading taking place. For purchases (sales), this means that a higher (lower) CAR(-10,-1) is 
associated with a lower (higher) CAR(0,+1). This implies that there should be a negative coefficient on 
CAR(-10,-1). We find that the coefficient is negative for each type of investor. More importantly, we find 
no evidence that it is greater in absolute value for foreign investors, so that there is no evidence that 
periods of intensive trading by foreign investors are more anticipated than periods of intensive trading by 
domestic investors.  
The result that prices move against foreign investors before they trade intensively suggests that they 
use price information differently from domestic institutions. Comparing the large buy trades of foreign 
investors to those of domestic institutions, we find (in results not reported in a table) that the return from 
the previous close is 0.762% when foreign investors buy and 0.427% when domestic institutions buy. 
Before large sell trades, the return is 0.159% when foreign investors sell and 0.458% when domestic 
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institutions sell. This is consistent with foreign institutions trading more on intra-day momentum than 
domestic institutions. If we make the same comparison with domestic individual investors, we find no 
difference for buy trades but the return before large sell trades for these investors is 0.662%, which is 
much larger than the return before large sell trades for foreign investors.  
Another way to understand better why foreign investors perform poorly compared to domestic 
investors when they trade intensively is provided by Table 6. To construct the table, we split the stocks 
each day into quintiles based on differences in trade values between domestic and foreign investors 
(normalized by the total trade value of the stock for the day), and report the results using a sample of large 
trades over 50 million won. The table delivers two consistent messages. First, foreign investors are 
disadvantaged when they have high trade values compared to domestic investors, but domestic investors 
are not equally disadvantaged when they have high trade values compared to foreign investors. For 
instance, for the comparison of buy trades for domestic institutions and foreign investors, the quintile 
where foreign investors have the highest trade value compared to domestic institutions (quintile Q1) 
shows the price ratio difference of -0.379%. In contrast, it is still negative and –0.040% for the quintile 
where domestic institutions have the highest trade value compared to foreign investors (quintile Q5). 
Second, when foreign investors have a high trade value relative to a type of domestic investors, prices 
move more in the direction of the trade value of foreign investors than when domestic investors have a 
high trade value. Looking again at buy trades, we see that when foreign investors have a high trade value 
compared to domestic institutions, the average daily return is 0.986%. The average return is significantly 
lower when domestic institutions have a high trade value compared to foreign investors. There is no 
evidence that the differences in daily returns are reversed on the next day. The two messages of the table 
are therefore that foreign investors are at a disadvantage and that prices move more in the direction of the 
trades of foreign investors than they do in the direction of the trades of domestic investors. The 
disadvantage of foreign investors is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that they pay a price for a 
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trading style that differs from the trading style of domestic institutions. At the same time, however, the 
trading style does not seem to explain the whole difference in price ratios since the regressions of Table 3 
control for the open-to-close returns which would be correlated with intra-day momentum trading and 
find despite this control that the price difference is worse for medium and large trades and is worse when 
foreigners trade intensively.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine whether foreign investors pay more than domestic investors when they buy 
shares and receive less when they sell shares. We find that they do so controlling for firm characteristics 
and market conditions, and more so compared to domestic institutions than to domestic individual 
investors and only for medium and large trades. The roundtrip difference is of the order of 37 basis points 
when we compared foreign money managers to domestic money managers. As discussed in the 
introduction, the roundtrip difference is roughly equivalent to half of the difference in Jensen’s monthly 
alpha between the top and bottom decile of mutual funds in the U.S. from 1962 through 1993. We 
examine whether this difference can be traced to greater impatience of foreign investors through an 
analysis of the price impact of intensive five-minute trading periods. We find that greater impatience 
cannot account for the disadvantage of foreign investors relative to domestic institutions. We also find no 
evidence that foreign investors are better informed. The critical difference between foreign investors and 
domestic investors is that prices tend to move more against foreign investors before they trade intensively. 
This difference is consistent with foreign investors trading more on intra-day momentum signals than 
domestic investors and paying a price for doing so. In the literature, some models show that it is optimal 
for less well-informed investors to chase returns.7 It is therefore possible that the disadvantage of foreign 
                                                     
7 See, for instance, Wang (1993) and Brennan and Cao (1997) 
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investors we document might be the result of them acting optimally in response to an information 
disadvantage.  
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Figure 1 
Cumulative net flows relative to total market capitalization for various investor groups (%, left axis), foreign ownership limit (%, 
right axis), and KOSPI index divided by 10 (right axis). 
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Figure 2 
Time series plot of daily trade-value-weighted average differences in buy (sell) price ratios across different investors 
The average buy (sell) price ratio for a stock is computed as 100)/( , ×did ji AB (%), where ∑∑= t dtjit dtjidtjid ji VVPB ,,,,  is the volume-
weighted average buy (sell) price for investor type j (j=(1), …, (3)) for stock i on day d, and ∑∑= t dtit dtidtidi VVPA  is the volume-
weighted average price for all trades for stock i on day d.  Split trades originated from an order are aggregated into a trade. Stocks whose 
prices have fallen below 1,000 won during the sample period are excluded from the analysis, and the analysis was performed on the 
stock-days with at least one foreign trade. The daily aggregate trade values for each investor type are used as weights in averaging price 
ratios across stocks on a day. The plot shows differences in the average daily price ratios across investor types. It also shows how the 
KOSPI  index, won/US$ exchange rate, and the ownership limits evolved during the sample period. 
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Figure 3 
Cumulative mean-adjusted return (%) around 5-minute intervals of large price-setting trades 
The price-setting order-imbalance (price-setting buy minus price-setting sell volume in shares) attributable to each type of investors 
(foreign investors, domestic institutions, individuals) is calculated for each eligible stock listed at the KSE from Dec. 2, 1996 to Nov. 30, 
1998, and then is normalized by the total share volume for the stock on the day. The sample includes the ten intervals with the largest 
normalized price-setting net buy and net sell order-imbalances for each investor type for each stock, excluding those intervals with less 
than 1,000 shares. The mean-adjusted return is computed for each interval as the interval return for the stock minus the mean observed on 
the same day of the week and the same time interval over the sample period.  The figure shows the cumulative mean-adjusted return from 
the 10th interval before an interval selected for the sample to the 10th interval afterwards for each investor type for purchases and for 
sales.  
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Table 1 
Average proportion (%) of intraday trading volume for each type of investor 
 
Relative to the trading volume for the interval Relative to the trading volume for the day 
(in values) (in shares) (in values) (in shares) Trading intervals 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Morning opening batch 75.0  12.4  12.7 81.8 8.8 9.4 2.9 0.7 0.7  3.9  0.5 0.5 
9:30 – 10:30 71.4  17.0  11.6 76.9 13.7 9.5 18.8 4.5 3.0  20.6  3.6 2.4 
10:30 – 11:30 68.8  17.2  14.0 74.3 14.2 11.5 15.8 3.9 3.1  17.0  3.2 2.6 
Afternoon opening batch  70.1  12.8  17.1 77.8 9.2 13.0 1.4 0.3 0.4  1.9  0.2 0.3 
13:00 – 14:00 65.2  17.9  16.9 71.6 14.6 13.8 10.5 3.0 2.8  11.6  2.4 2.2 
14:00 – 14:50 65.6  18.0  16.5 71.5 14.8 13.7 11.6 3.2 3.0  12.4  2.6 2.4 
Closing batch 62.2  18.7  19.1 67.8 15.9 16.3 4.4 1.4 1.4  4.5  1.1 1.1 
Extended trading hours 60.4  20.5  19.1 65.4 17.3 17.3 0.2 0.4 0.2  0.2  0.2 0.3 
 
This table reports the average proportions (%) of intraday trading volume for each of three classes of investors relative to the total trading 
volume for the interval and for the day (both in shares and values, respectively), using a sample of stocks whose prices have not fallen 
below 1,000 won during the sample period from Dec. 2, 1996 to Nov. 30, 1998, and whose stock-days have at least one foreign trade. The 
three classes of investors include (1) Korean individuals (2) Korean money managers (securities, mutual, pension funds) and banks (banks, 
insurance, merchant banks), and (3) Foreign money managers and banks (including resident foreigners). 
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Table 2 
Average buy (sell) price ratios for 6 investor types relative to the average trading price (12/2/96 ~ 11/30/98: 586 days) 
 
Panel A. Equal-weighted average buy price ratios relative to daily average prices (%) 
Domestic investors Non-resident foreign investors 
Buy price ratios (1) 
Individual 
(2) Money 
managers 
(3) 
Banks 
(4) 
Individual 
(5) Money 
managers 
(6) 
Banks 
Buy: All trades 
Avg. of daily median trade size (000 won) 17,678 53,906 68,108 19,700 44,901  59,619 
Avg. of mean A (won) 28,907 30,869 30,156 24,506 30,611  34,758 
Avg. of mean Buy B/A 99.844 99.999 99.922 100.013 99.988  99.930 
(t-stat: H0 = 100) (-23.34) (-0.06) (-4.12) (0.32) (-1.21) (-2.68) 
Avg. of std dev of Buy B/A 0.768 1.178 1.290 1.481 1.229  1.067 
Avg. number of stocks per day 73.8 48.5 20.9 6.7 68.2  9.7 
Difference of Buy B/A from (1)  -0.142 -0.031 -0.082 -0.151  -0.058 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)  (-9.66) (-1.36) (-1.97) (-10.50) (-1.86) 
Difference of Buy B/A from (2)   0.065 -0.008 0.024  0.012 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)   (2.53) (-0.13) (1.54) (0.32) 
Difference of Buy B/A from (3)    -0.141 -0.034  -0.031 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)    (-1.66) (-1.25) (-0.57) 
Buy: Small trades subsample (≤ 5 million won) 
Avg. of daily median trade size (000 won) 1,916 2,223 2,526 2,519 2,574  2,586 
Avg. number of stocks per day 73.4 23.2 4.7 3.6 32.4  4.5 
Difference of Buy B/A from (1)  -0.173 -0.060 0.015 -0.012  0.127 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)  (-5.99) (-1.03) (0.24) (-0.67) (2.67) 
Difference of Buy B/A from (2)   0.190 0.256 0.130  0.293 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)   (1.67) (2.07) (3.11) (3.41) 
Buy: Medium trades subsample (≤ 50 million won) 
Avg. of daily median trade size (000 won) 10,239 22,520 24,608 16,392 19,224  18,696 
Avg. number of stocks per day 71.1 37.6 14.5 4.7 54.8  7.9 
Difference of Buy B/A from (1)  0.016 0.091 -0.099 -0.043  -0.044 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)  (1.05) (3.49) (-1.93) (-3.21) (-1.24) 
Difference of Buy B/A from (2)   0.038 -0.205 -0.042  -0.106 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)   (1.14) (-2.61) (-2.38) (-2.14) 
Buy: Large trades subsample (> 50 million won) 
Avg. of daily median trade size (000 won) 75,871 135,793 148,616 103,547 148,515  193,062 
Avg. number of stocks per day 31.9 27.5 11.2 1.8 27.6 3.8 
Difference of Buy B/A from (1)  0.107 0.110 0.130 -0.016  0.022 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)  (4.83) (3.06) (1.00) (-0.60) (0.29) 
Difference of Buy B/A from (2)   -0.029 -0.156 -0.143  -0.166 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)   (-0.85) (-0.88) (-5.27) (-2.22) 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Equal-weighted average sell price ratios relative to daily average prices (%) 
Domestic investors Non-resident foreign investors 
Sell price ratios (1) 
Individual 
(2) Money 
managers 
(3) 
Banks 
(4) 
Individual 
(5) Money 
managers 
(6) 
Banks 
Sell: All trades 
Avg. of daily median trade size (000 won) 17,857 42,000 64,542 20,635 41,258  39,268 
Avg. of mean A (won) 26,921 27,482 27,538 27,565 27,974  28,879 
Avg. of mean Sell B/A 100.129 99.929 100.065 99.995 99.961  99.964 
(t-stat: H0 = 100) (28.14) (-6.10) (3.48) (-0.13) (-4.06) (-1.47) 
Avg. of std dev of Sell B/A 0.617 1.258 1.295 1.486 1.224  0.986 
Avg. number of stocks per day 72.9 56.6 23.2 6.0 66.8  8.8 
Difference of Sell B/A from (1)  0.201 0.062 0.069 0.175  0.149 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)  (14.83) (3.11) (1.61) (14.47) (5.22) 
Difference of Sell B/A from (2)   -0.129 -0.015 -0.016  -0.050 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)   (-5.44) (-0.26) (-1.02) (-1.42) 
Difference of Sell B/A from (3)    -0.010 0.163  0.107 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)    (-0.12) (6.37) (1.90) 
Sell: Small trades subsample (≤ 5 million won) 
Avg. of daily median trade size (000 won) 1,788 1,358 2,498 2,357 2,587  2,561 
Avg. number of stocks per day 72.8 41.2 6.1 3.0 31.2  4.2 
Difference of Sell B/A from (1)  0.344 -0.011 0.085 0.050  0.042 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)  (17.89) (-0.24) (1.22) (3.23) (0.95) 
Difference of Sell B/A from (2)   -0.350 -0.265 -0.218  -0.164 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)   (-4.88) (-2.18) (-8.08) (-2.58) 
Sell: Medium trades subsample (≤ 50 million won) 
Avg. of daily median trade size (000 won) 10,055 21,504 24,071 17,054 19,085  18,468 
Avg. number of stocks per day 71.2 41.4 16.8 4.1 53.6  7.0 
Difference of Sell B/A from (1)  0.092 -0.015 0.057 0.131  0.186 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)  (6.39) (-0.61) (1.10) (10.91) (5.44) 
Difference of Sell B/A from (2)   -0.117 0.020 0.085  0.058 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)   (-3.61) (0.29) (4.67) (1.35) 
Sell: Large trades subsample (> 50 million won) 
Avg. of daily median trade size (000 won) 78,983 136,191 142,704 118,556 132,927  153,977 
Avg. number of stocks per day 31.1 28.6 12.3 1.8 25.9  3.1 
Difference of Sell B/A from (1)  0.124 0.030 -0.093 0.241  0.143 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)  (6.12) (0.95) (-0.60) (9.18) (2.46) 
Difference of Sell B/A from (2)   -0.075 -0.032 0.133  0.023 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)   (-2.36) (-0.24) (5.27) (0.36) 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 
Panel C. Trade value-weighted average buy and sell price ratios relative to daily average prices (%) 
Domestic investors Non-resident foreign investors Trade price ratios  
(Trade-value weighted results) (1) 
Individual 
(2) Money 
managers 
(3) 
Banks 
(4) 
Individual 
(5) Money 
managers 
(6) 
Banks 
Buy: All trades 
Difference of Buy B/A from (1)  -0.041 -0.103 -0.168 -0.263  -0.160 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)  (-1.50) (-2.82) (-3.41) (-10.98) (-4.21) 
Difference of Buy B/A from (2)   -0.082 -0.074 -0.212  -0.132 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)   (-2.23) (-1.09) (-7.78) (-2.95) 
Difference of Buy B/A from (3)    -0.131 -0.213  -0.119 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)    (-1.38) (-5.04) (-1.82) 
Buy: Small trades subsample (≤ 5 million won) 
Difference of Buy B/A from (1)  -0.187 -0.087 0.012 -0.121  0.047 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)  (-6.37) (-1.43) (0.20) (-6.53) (1.06) 
Difference of Buy B/A from (2)   0.145 0.202 0.004  0.180 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)   (1.26) (1.61) (0.09) (2.05) 
Buy: Medium trades subsample (≤ 50 million won) 
Difference of Buy B/A from (1)  0.010 0.041 -0.122 -0.088  -0.073 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)  (0.70) (1.53) (-2.32) (-7.45) (-2.24) 
Difference of Buy B/A from (2)   -0.054 -0.210 -0.131  -0.133 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)   (-1.52) (-2.58) (-6.41) (-2.81) 
Buy: Large trades subsample (> 50 million won) 
Difference of Buy B/A from (1)  0.105 0.055 0.105 -0.101  -0.050 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)  (2.92) (1.19) (0.76) (-2.75) (-0.62) 
Difference of Buy B/A from (2)   -0.096 -0.184 -0.234  -0.267 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)   (-2.25) (-1.03) (-6.45) (-3.24) 
Sell: All trades 
Difference of Sell B/A from (1)  0.233 0.121 0.096 0.331  0.230 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)  (9.46) (4.18) (1.81) (18.38) (7.10) 
Difference of Sell B/A from (2)   -0.075 0.015 0.163  0.012 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)   (-2.36) (0.22) (6.82) (0.31) 
Difference of Sell B/A from (3)    0.006 0.300  0.127 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)    (0.06) (8.42) (2.10) 
Sell: Small trades subsample (≤ 5 million won) 
Difference of Sell B/A from (1)  0.274 -0.015 0.123 0.185  0.118 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)  (13.73) (-0.32) (1.70) (11.47) (2.72) 
Difference of Sell B/A from (2)   -0.320 -0.299 -0.074  -0.121 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)   (-4.20) (-2.45) (-2.29) (-1.83) 
Sell: Medium trades subsample (≤ 50 million won) 
Difference of Sell B/A from (1)  0.134 0.078 0.060 0.250  0.225 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)  (9.65) (3.00) (1.09) (21.57) (6.80) 
Difference of Sell B/A from (2)   -0.074 0.038 0.190  0.087 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)   (-1.96) (0.49) (9.74) (2.06) 
Sell: Large trades subsample (> 50 million won) 
Difference of Sell B/A from (1)  0.177 0.058 -0.182 0.268  0.158 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)  (6.23) (1.53) (-1.17) (8.45) (2.60) 
Difference of Sell B/A from (2)   -0.069 -0.123 0.172  0.066 
(t-stat: H0 = 0)   (-1.73) (-0.91) (4.64) (0.91) 
 
The average buy (sell) price ratio is computed as 100)/( , ×did ji AB (%), where ∑∑= t dtjit dtjidtjid ji VVPB ,,,,  is the volume-weighted 
average buy (sell) price for investor type j (j=(1), …, (6)) for stock i on day d, and ∑∑= t dtit dtidtidi VVPA  is the volume-weighted 
average price for all trades for stock i on day d. In order to control for a trade-volume effect on the price ratios, d jiB ,  is further 
disaggregated into three groups based on trade sizes whose cutoff points are 5 million won and 50 million won. Split trades originated 
from an order are aggregated into a trade. Stocks whose prices have fallen below 1,000 won during the sample period are excluded from 
the analysis, and the analysis was performed on the stock-days with at least one foreign trade. For panels A and B, the price ratios and 
their differences across investors are averaged equally across stocks on a day and then across days. For panel C, daily aggregate trade 
values for each investor type are used as weights in averaging price ratios across stocks on a day and then across days. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. 
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